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Abstract—The Social Internet of Things (SIoT), integration of Inter-
net of Things and Social networks paradigms, has been introduced to
build a network of smart nodes which are capable of establishing
social links. In order to deal with misbehavioral service provider
nodes, service requestor nodes must evaluate their trustworthiness
levels. In this paper, we propose a novel trust management mechanism
in the SIoT to predict the most reliable service provider for a service
requestor, that leads to reduce the risk of exposing to malicious
nodes. We model an SIoT with a flexible bipartite graph (containing
two sets of nodes: service providers and requestors), then build the
corresponding social network among service requestor nodes, using
Hellinger distance. After that, we develop a social trust model, by
using nodes’ centrality and similarity measures, to extract behavioral
trust between the network nodes. Finally, a matrix factorization
technique is designed to extract latent features of SIoT nodes to
mitigate the data sparsity and cold start problems. We analyze the
effect of parameters in the proposed trust prediction mechanism
on prediction accuracy. The results indicate that feedbacks from the
neighboring nodes of a specific service requestor with high Hellinger
similarity in our mechanism outperforms the best existing methods.
We also show that utilizing social trust model, which only considers
the similarity measure, significantly improves the accuracy of the
prediction mechanism. Furthermore, we evaluate the effectiveness of
the proposed trust management system through a real-world SIoT
application. Our results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism is
resilient to different types of network attacks and it can accurately
find the proper service provider with high trustworthiness.
Index Terms—Social Internet of Things, Trust Management, Bipartite
Graphs, Matrix Factorization, Hellinger Distance.
I. Introduction
THE Internet of Things (IoT) can be seen as a variety ofheterogeneous technologies and a large number of things
(aka objects) that tend to interact with each other through unique
addressing schemes, reaching a common goal such as managing
transportation in a smart city [1], [2]. The number of IoT objects
is growing unprecedentedly [3]–[6]. In order to build a network
of objects (a set of smart nodes with the ability of establishing
social links for information sharing), combination of IoT and
social networking paradigm, Social Internet of Things (SIoT), has
been introduced [7]. Based on [8], one can observe a generational
leap from objects with a certain level of smartness to objects with
a concrete social awareness which are able to use environmental
consciousness to take an appropriate action. Without considering
this potential, the evolution and progress of the SIoT, containing
trillions of objects, cannot be achieved. In SIoT, objects act
as autonomous agents. Alongside their individuality, they can
request and provide information and services to each other. The
advantages of this convergence are as follows [2]:
1) A Social IoT guarantees both the network navigability,
which refers to effective discovery of objects and services,
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and the network scalability just like the human social
networks.
2) Levels of trustworthiness could be established by leverag-
ing the degree of interaction among autonomous things
which are friends.
3) The previously designed models to study social networks
could be extended to re-use in Social IoT.
A. Problem Statement
The concept of trust is a longstanding research topic in com-
puter science, and its meaning varies in how it is represented in
different communities [9]. Since trust is a complicated concept,
no categorical consensus on definition of trust can be found in
the scientific literature. Furthermore, one of the most significant
problems is that there is no unified metric or evaluation method-
ology [10], [11]. In this paper, our trust definition is inspired by
the trust notion given in [12], as:
Definition 1. After a service requestor send-out a task for execu-
tion, the initiator of the task losses its control on the task, then
the service provider is able to perform its probable malicious
animus. Thus, in order to receive the desired service, a service
requestor must evaluate the service providers competence, and
decide whether to delegate its task to the service provider.
The evaluation process of a service provider’s competence by
a service requestor is called trust.
For convenience, we define trustor and trustee, as follows:
Definition 2. Trustor is a service requestor node in SIoT which has
a task to delegate, and evaluates the outcome of the service providers
returned response.
Definition 3. Trustee is a service provider node in SIoT that is capable
of providing some type of services as the trustor asks, and is beyond
the trustors direct control.
The nature of trust is context-dependent, i.e., a trustor trusts a
trustee in a specific context, but as the context alters, the trustor
may decide not to trust that trustee [12]. The context is related to
the characteristics of the service. Depending on which service is
requested, it is possible to emphasize the necessity of the service
characteristics [13]. The trustor expects proper result from the
trustee. The expectation is positive if the trustee returns the
desired result. The trustee may not produce a favorable result.
Thus, the trustor is subject to the potential loss and failure
imposed by the trustee. After getting a response, the trustor
measures and rates the trustworthiness of the trustee based on
the characteristic of the received service, and keep its experience
to use in future decisions.
From the definition of trust between SIoT objects, a malicious
node (object) may break the basic functionality of the network by
destroying the reputation of good behavior nodes, or increasing
the trustworthiness of malicious ones. In this paper, we focus on
the five popular attacks by which a node can violate the existing
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2trust or break functionality of the devices in the network, as
follows:
1) Whitewashing Attack (WWA): A malicious node which has
unfavorable (bad) reputation leaves and rejoins the network
to avoid the retributions it may encounter due to its poor
trustworthiness value. This attack usually happens when
the attacker (malicious node) can easily change its identity.
2) Self-Promoting Attack (SPA): A malicious node pretends
to be a beneficial trustee by recommending itself as a
trustworthy (good) object, but represents bad behavior.
3) Bad-Mouthing Attack (BMA): A malicious node annihilates
the reputation of a well-behaved node by faking bad expe-
riences about it, and thereby intercepts its services.
4) Ballot Stuffing Attack or Good-Mouthing Attack (GMA): A
malicious node falsely promotes a misbehavior node (as
a well-behaved node) to boost its chance of being selected
as a trustee.
5) Opportunistic Service Attack (OSA): A malicious node be-
haves like a non-malicious node in its early appearance
to gain high reputation opportunistically. Then, as soon as
gaining enough reputation, the node begins its malicious
behaviors like SPA, BMA, and GMA attacks.
Trust management is a mechanism to predict the most reliable
trustee for a certain trustor. Trust management lets SIoT objects
to overcome the risk of exposing to malicious nodes and the per-
ceptions of uncertainty. Trust management systems can improve
the trust among the objects in an IoT system [14]. These systems
encourage nodes to have honest collaboration, while reducing
the effect of malicious nodes and their anomalous functionality.
A practical and effective trust management mechanism must
fulfill the following requirements:
• Resistance to attack: Trust management mechanism should
provide resiliency against related attacks.
• Overcoming resource constraints: In IoT, objects are often
very constrained in terms of memory, power supply, and
processing power [15], thus, strong security measures like
heavy cryptography are not applicable.
• Locality: A trust management method must not depend too
much on a remote central node, that restricts the scalability
and induces harmful effects. For instance, a pitfall of cen-
tralized trust management can cause the failure of the whole
system [16].
• Robustness against data sparsity: Trust management systems
should not suffer from the data sparsity problem and the
cold start problem, which is an inability of the system to
predict trust values properly due to lack of enough data for
recently joined users.
Until now, we have described the concept of trust and the
requirements for a trust management system in SIoT. Next, we
explain the motivation and importance of trust management in
SIoT.
B. Motivation
Over time, it is anticipated that IoT is going to be extensively
practical from smart homes to business applications [15], how-
ever, security (in particular trust) remains a major challenge
in such networks. For instance, imagine a smart door which
could be opened or locked remotely via the Internet. This smart
door can collect the most sensitive and personal information
of our lives. In such automated communications, the personal
information usually processed by an external service provider
(trustee) which is beyond the reach of the user [17]. Trust is a
fundamental issue since several devices with various behaviors
characterize the SIoT environment [10].
Hilton [18] described a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attack conducted against domain name service provider Dyn,
leading to service outages of major sites like Github, Twitter,
Netflix, Paypal on October 21, 2016. In a DDoS attack, the
perpetrator botnet seeks to make a network resource unavailable
to its legitimate users by flooding the targeted machine or
resource with superfluous requests. What is notable about this
attack is the fact that the attack was not carried out with spoofed
source addresses, but rather a direct attack from numerous of
IP addresses belonging to constrained IoT devices including
printers, coffee makers, washing machines, refrigerators, etc.
Consequently, the motivation for proposing an efficient trust
management method for SIoT is obvious; there are misbehavior
devices (objects) owned by misbehavior users that aim to attack
others with the goal of gaining more profit, while causing others’
services cut off. These misbehavior nodes entail restriction and
denial of a class of services. Since the provision of trust in this
environment is integrated with provision of service, each trustor
have to decide whether to use the trustee’s service based on
the level of trust between them or not. So, trust is one of the
most critical issues in SIoT which must be addressed before the
prevalence of the network [19], [20].
To the best of our knowledge, there is no sufficient work on
trust management in SIoT, and most of the previous works could
not achieve an efficient trust management model. This paper
aims to present a novel trust management mechanism with the
capability of trust prediction in SIoT. Later, we will show that our
method is accurate yet resilient to different attacks and satisfies
the aforementioned requirements.
II. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, there is limited relevant work
on trust management in SIoT, particularly considering misbe-
havior users who attack the well behavior nodes through their
possessed SIoT devices [11], [17], [19]–[21]. In this section, we
discuss previous related works.
Chen et al. [19] developed an adaptive trust management
protocol for SIoT systems and tried to reduce the probability
of being attacked by dynamically changing the configuration
of devices. However, their model is user-based which means
the network nodes have social relation through their owners’
social network, hence, the social relation between SIoT objects
are constrained to the social relation between the owners. The
other weakness of this model is that the authors divided SIoT
devices into two inflexible types (i.e. devices and owners), such
that trustees should be selected from the pre-defined devices and
trustors are only selected from the owners.
Nizamkari [22] followed the same idea as Chen et al. [19].
The trustor uses its own experience and its friends’ experiences
for evaluating the trustworthiness of a trustee. However, the
most important difference between them is that, in the former,
if the trustor’s friends do not have appropriate requested ex-
periences, trustor inquires its friends of friends. The influence
of friends of friends recommendation could be obtained from
nodes similarity or the network structure. Nevertheless, there
are two inabilities to tackle the prediction issues. First, their
proposed recommender cannot predict the rating for an object
which has not been rated yet. Second, the author did not propose
any solution for the situation when searching nodes for finding
friends of friends (experience) terminates in identical results.
Kantarci et al. [23] studied a cloud-centric IoT, which is called
crowd computing. In their framework, mobile sensors are used
3as IoT devices that reside in the cloud. In this scenario, users
can utilize other users’ phone sensors by installing a specific
application and joining its associated social network. Then, a
user issues a task and a crowd management authority candidates
some of the social network users for assigning the task. After
that, one of the candidates is selected based on its reputation in
the social network for performing the task. The most significant
weakness of this framework is the need for a central node
to manage the issues, store users’ reputation, and process a
large amount of data per issue. Today, accepting a central node
for processing and managing all the tasks is not practical [22]
because of the scalability issues, as the number of IoT devices is
tremendously growing.
Mendoza and Kleinschmidt [14] used the experiences of
trustor’s neighbors and the quality of trustee’s services to evalu-
ate the trust between trustors and trustees. However, each trustor
must store a table of other nodes and their experiences. This trust
management model can detect malicious behaviors, but storing
such a large table is non-practical for lightweight IoT objects.
Chen et al. [24] proposed a trust management model based
on fuzzy reputation to evaluate trust in IoT systems. However,
their trust management model considers only wireless sensors
which is a specific IoT environment, and they take into account
only QoS trust metrics such as energy consumption and packet
delivery ratio. Moreover, they did not take into consideration the
social relationship between the objects.
Sharma et al. [11] proposed a novel solution for the mainte-
nance of trust and preservation of privacy rules in SIoT in the
form of a lightweight query mechanism with the help of fission
computing. For the implementation of the proposed solution,
mini-edge servers are used as crowdsources. Although the au-
thors asserted that the trust would be provided without sanc-
tioning adversaries, [25] claimed that users may expose selfish
behavior in relaying data for others due to limited resources or
social objectives. Furthermore, demanding for 5G infrastructure
and a center to administer the queries are other weaknesses of
their mechanism.
Yu et al. [26] suggested blockchain for data management to
provide end-to-end trust and remove the trusted third-party in
decentralized IoT systems. However, there is a trade-off between
scalability and privacy in their proposed mechanism. Hence, it
could not afford both parameters, simultaneously. Moreover, the
authors ignored the fundamental constraints of the IoT objects.
Premarathne [7] proposed a model to compute trust among
pairs of nodes in SIoT networks. The trust between nodes is in-
dicated by link probability which is computed based on objects’
social relationships or their attributes. However, the overhead
of storing such attributes and related data is not negligible [4].
Furthermore, this model needs an authorized central node to
configure appropriate attributes and multiply the affinity values
of node attributes.
Due to the problem of fully distributed and centralized trust
management systems, Kim [16] proposed an authentication and
authorization infrastructure for IoT to be locally centralized and
globally distributed. His solution is scalable and utilizes edge
devices. However, it ignores dynamicity and sociality of the
network devices.
Xiao et al. [27] proposed a trust model for SIoT that uses
two parameters, Guarantor and Reputation. Their model enables
to detect and isolate malicious nodes by penalizing malicious
activities. However, their model needs a central server to store,
update, and manage the reputations of the objects and respond
to reputation queries. Another drawback of their model is that
they did not consider the resource constraints of SIoT objects.
Chen et al. [28] proposed a scalable and adaptive trust man-
agement protocol in SOA-based SIoT systems which is dis-
tributed and utilizes users’ feedbacks using similarity rating of
friendship, social contact, and community of interest relation-
ships. Their protocol takes some SIoT constraints into account
such as limited storage and computing capacity of devices by
storing trust information only for a limited set of nodes and de-
manding less process to update trust. However, considering only
a limited set of nodes is not a scalable solution fundamentally.
In addition, social relationship between objects is not taken into
consideration in their protocol.
According to our literature review, there are very few previous
works on SIoT trust management which test their proposed
solutions against the aforementioned attacks in section I-B. In
this paper, we propose a novel trust management mechanism in
SIoT and analyze it in the presence of malicious nodes.
III. Proposed Method
In this section, we (1) introduce a bipartite graph model
for social internet of things (Section III-A); (2) build a social
network among trustors using Hellinger distance (Section III-B);
(3) introduce a new social trust model for trustors based on the
constructed social network (Section III-C); (4) utilize a matrix
factorization mechanism to recommend a model which trustors
can employ in order to find the most trustworthy trustee (Section
III-D); (5) discusses in Section III-E how the proposed model
fulfills the required obligations mentioned in section I-A.
A. Bipartite SIoT Model
Based on the applications of SIoT objects, a well-known ar-
chitecture for SIoT would be service-oriented [19]. Each device
in the system can play the role of trustor, trustee, or both [19].
Hence, we believe that bipartite graphs are suitable models for
representing social internet of things. Without loss of generality,
one can assume that there is a limited number of service types
which could be performed among SIoT objects. For each service
type, we can consider a bipartite network with two set of nodes,
trustors U and trustees V . Considering a specific bipartite net-
work, trustor u ∈ U has a directed link (edge) to trustee v ∈ V , if
trustor u has used at least one of the services provided by trustee
v, otherwise, there is no edge between them. Each edge in the
bipartite network has a weight in interval (0, 1], which represents
the trust experience of u by using a service from v. Figure 1
illustrates a bipartite graph corresponding to an IoT system.
The trust experience consists of weighted sum of parameters
like accuracy of response, return time of response, etc. These
parameters vary based on the trustor and the requested service
type.
Let G = (U,V , E) be a bipartite graph with two set of nodes,
trustors U = {u1, u2, ..., un} and trustees V = {v1, v2, ..., vm}, and
E = {(u1, v1), (u2, v2), ..., (un, vm)} represents the weighted edges
from trustors to trustees. Bi-adjacency matrix B of graph is a
matrix of size n × m wherein bi,j , 0 if and only if (ui , vj ) ∈ E ,
and bi,j = 0 otherwise. Row i in the bi-adjacency matrix is a
vector corresponding to trustor ui and represents the experience
rates of this trustor to any trustees.
B. Social Network of Trustors
In this section, we want to extract implicit social relations
between trustors from the aforementioned bipartite graph, based
on the trustors scores and their past experiences. The extracted
social relations can indicate behavioral trust similarity among
trustors in the network. Since the similarity measures are in some
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Fig. 1: Example of a bipartite graph indicating a part of an IoT
system. This IoT system consists of smart cars, smart homes,
and smart power grids; each contains both trustor and trustee
nodes.
sense the inverse of the distance metrics [29]–[31], we generate
a social network of trustors using a distance metric.
Hellinger distance (aka Bhattacharyya distance) is a type of f-
divergence metrics which was introduced by Ernst Hellinger [32].
We chose Hellinger distance as a distance metric for three rea-
sons: (1) as trust concept is inherently a non-deterministic prob-
lem, we need a statistical metric to measure distances between
the nodes; (2) Hellinger distance satisfies the triangle inequality,
so, differences between trustors will be properly demonstrated;
(3) it holds symmetry and positive definite properties which are
essential for a well-defined distance metric [30].
To measure the similarity between each pair of trustors, we
apply Hellinger distance to the degree distribution of their
neighbors. Let Lu = {lk }k∈[ d] be the probability distribution
over all neighbors of trustor node u, where lk is the number
of neighbors of u with degree of exactly k, and d is the greatest
degree of trustees in the network. Now, the Hellinger distance
between two trustors ui and u j can be defined as:
Hell(ui , u j ) = 1√
2
Lui − Lu j  (1)
Now, we have an n× n distance matrix, where n is the number of
trustors in the bipartite network. By considering an appropriate
threshold, a social relation between any pair of trustors, based on
how close nodes are to each other, could be formed. As a result,
a new social network of trustors is created. The network can be
displayed by adjacency matrix An×n as:
Ai,j =
{
1, Hell(ui , u j ) < threshold
0, otherwise
C. Social Trust Model
In this section, we aim to develop a trust model which ex-
presses how similar the trustors are, based on their trust patterns.
For this purpose, past experiences of trustors, the social network
from the previous section, and various similarity and centrality
measures are employed.
1) Similarity
Similarity between network nodes (trustors) is one of the most
essential factors that adheres to their trust patterns [33]–[37].
Different similarity metrics are mentioned here, and we use them
in order to extract trust patterns among users of the network.
Bayesian Similarity. Cosine similarity (COS) and Pearson
correlation coefficient (PCC) are widely used to determine the
degree of similarity between nodes in a network. However,
they suffer from substantial shortcomings, such as: (1) These
metrics have flat-value, opposite-value, single-value, and cross-
value problems as illustrated in [31]; (2) COS and PCC could be
misleading because they are known as similarity measures that
disregard rating vector length but only consider rating direction
[38], as mentioned in [39]. According to these issues, we chose
Bayesian similarity (BS) metric which is based on the Dirichlet
distribution [31]. Even though this similarity is a rating-based
measure, it does not suffer from the data sparsity problem or
many other problems that pointed out in [40]. BS does not
consider mutually rated trustees, instead utilizes the preferences
of trustors by considering both direction (rating distances) and
length (ratings amount) of rating/experience vectors. Rating
distance between two nodes ui and u j is modeled by the Dirichlet
distribution and can be calculated as dui ,u j = |rui − ru j |, then the
similarity between trustors ui and u j could be:
BS(ui , u j ) = max(BS′ui ,u j − BS′′ui ,u j − δ, 0) (2)
In this relation BS′ui ,u j = 1 −
dui ,uj
dmax
is called overall similarity
where dmax is the maximum possible rating distance. Bayesian
similarity is computed by removing the chance correlation
BS′′ui ,u j and user bias δ from the overall similarity. In addition,
the similarity originated from data sparsity problem would be
resolved by subtracting the chance correlation [30], [31].
Hellinger Similarity. For Hellinger similarity, we use the
Hellinger distance discussed in Equation (1). This measure is
analogously a rating-based measure but tolerates the problems
mentioned earlier.
Connection Similarity. The connection similarity takes the
advantage of connections in the proposed social network of
trustors to derive similarity between trustors (nodes). From the
perspective of this similarity measure, the mutual connections
between nodes are considerable. The list of connections for each
node can be easily obtained with the adjacency matrix of the
network. Let F(ui) be the list of friends for trustor ui . For
each node pair, the connection similarity is proportional to the
number of their mutual friends, as [41], [42]:
conn(ui , u j ) =
F(ui) ∩ F(u j )
F(ui) (3)
2) Centrality
Another criterion in social networks which has a significant
impact on nodes’ trustworthiness is centrality [43]–[45]. In social
networks, a node with high centrality is more likely to be
followed in comparison to the other nodes [46]–[50]. Hence, the
following centrality measures are considered to be used in order
to discover trustor’s behavior.
Degree Centrality. Degree centrality is the simplest and eas-
iest centrality measure to compute. It (basically) indicates the
importance of nodes in a social network [51]–[53]. It is defined
as the number of edges (links) incident upon a node. Degree
centrality degui of a trustor ui can be formalized as:
deg(ui) =
∑
∀j,j,i
Ai,j (4)
5where Ai,j is an element of the adjacency matrix of trustors
network which indicates the connection between trustors ui and
u j [43].
Betweenness-Local Clustering Centrality (BLC). Since we
need a centrality measure to evaluate nodes’ influence on its
neighborhood, we employ betweenness-local clustering (BLC)
centrality as described in [54]. Even though the betweenness
centrality [55] partially describes the importance of nodes, as
it is a global evaluation parameter, it cannot present the relative
influence of nodes in a local environment precisely, especially
in large-scale complex networks [54]. With the combination of
betweenness centrality and local clustering coefficient [56], the
importance of node ui would be attained more accurate [54], as:
BLC(ui) =
BCui
CCui
(5)
where BCui is betweenness centrality of node ui and CCui
denotes its local clustering coefficient.
3) Trust Pattern Similarity
In order to achieve trust pattern similarity of trustors, we
utilize the combination of similarity and centrality to create a
new measure to evaluate how much trustors ui and u j have
similar behavior in trusting the trustees [41], [42], [57]:
Γ(ui , u j ) = β
Sim(ui , u j )∑
uk |Aui ,uk =1
Sim(ui , uk )
+ (1 − β) Cen(u j )∑
uk |Aui ,uk =1
Cen(uk )
(6)
where parameter β indicates the amount of contribution of
similarity and centrality. Indeed, Γ(ui , u j ) constructs a similarity
matrix based on trustors trust pattern in the proposed method.
D. Prediction Mechanism using Matrix Factorization
Matrix factorization has become a powerful technique in bi-
partite network analysis [58]–[62], and is a practical technique
to engage with trust relations [63]–[65]. It can be used in di-
mensionality reduction, latent features extraction, and mitigating
the sparsity property of data. A matrix factorization technique
has different models, including Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) [66], Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [67], Proba-
bilistic Matrix Factorization (PMF) [68], and Non-negative Matrix
Factorization (NMF) [69].
There are three important factors when a trustor wants to
select a particular trustee to dispatch its task: (1) features of
the trustor, (2) features of the trustee, and (3) the previous
(trust) experiences between them. It is a tough work to extract,
maintain, and keep the node features up to date. Besides, most of
the times, there are few experiences available, particularly when
the node is a newcomer to the network. Therefore, we chose a
SVD model [41], [42], [64] to extract latent features and mitigate
the data sparsity issue. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first trust management mechanism that employs a matrix
factorization model.
In order to learn two L−dimensional latent feature represen-
tations of trustors S and trustees R matrices, the bi-adjacency
matrix B is factorized. Thus, each column of S ∈ RL×n and
R ∈ RL×m respectively performs as a L−dimensional trustor
and trustee latent feature vector. Due to the fact that trustors
only have experience about a limited number of trustees, the bi-
adjacency matrix B is highly sparse. Here, the low-rank matrix
factorization approach seeks to approximate the bi-adjacency
matrix B by multiplying the two L−dimensional factors S and
R.
B ≈ S × R (7)
The SVD method usually utilizes the following cost function
to reconstruct and predict the missing values of bi-adjacency
matrix B:
L(S, R, B) = 1
2
‖B − ST R‖2F (8)
where ‖.‖2
F
implies the Frobenius norm. As mentioned earlier, B
is mostly sparse, so we only should factorize the existing values.
Thus, the above cost function can be reduced to:
L(S, R, B) = 1
2
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Ii j (Bi j − STi Rj )2 (9)
Here, Ii j is an indicator function that takes value 1 if Bi j exists
and 0 otherwise.
Users in social networks mostly trust their friends [70], conse-
quently, we assume that objects in SIoT trust their social network
friends as which specified in Section III-B. Therefore, depending
on how much a trustor object is similar to its friends based on
the trusting behavior function Γ, reconstruction of matrix B relies
on both trustor’s features and its friends’ features. So, we can
redefine the cost function as:
L(S, R, B) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Ii j
(
Bi j − g
(
αSTi Rj + (1 − α)
∑
k∈F(i)
ΓikS
T
k Rj
) )2
(10)
where α balances between the two mentioned factors, and Γ
function is calculated according to Equation (6). k ∈ F(i) shows
the social network friends (neighbors) of trustor ui . The argu-
ment that passed to g(.) is employed to predict missing values of
B, which may exceed the valid range (0, 1], hence, it is mapped
through a nonlinear logistic function g(x) = 1/(1 + exp(−x)) to
rebound to the valid range.
One can also add a regularization term to the cost function
to avoid the over-fitting issue. Finally, the sum-of-squared-errors
cost function with quadratic regularization terms could be de-
fined as:
L(S, R, B) = 1
2
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Ii j
(
Bi j −g
(
αSTi Rj + (1−α)
∑
k∈F(i)
ΓikS
T
k Rj
) )2
+
λS
2
‖S‖2F +
λR
2
‖R‖2F (11)
where hyper-parameters λS , λR > 0 are S and R latent variance
ratios. As, finding the global optimum is often difficult, Stochas-
tic Gradient Descent (SGD) could be applied several times to
get the best local minimum [64]. Also, this cost function has an
attractive probabilistic interpretation with Gaussian observation
noise (for more detail, see [68]).
Now, a trustor node ui , by having the bi-adjacency matrix B,
can acquire the two latent feature matrices S and R; then, it can
utilize the following equation in order to reproduce B, as:
B̂ = g(ST R) (12)
where g is the non-linear logostic function.
Afterward, the trustor ui can extract the i’th row of B̂ and sort
it to obtain a vector of trustees ordered by their trustworthiness
value. Consequently, a trustor can select the most trustworthy
trustee to dispatch its task. In this way, a trustor can predict
which service provider (trustee) is most reliable and best suited
for it.
E. How our Method Addresses the Requirements?
In this section, we demonstrate how the proposed trust
management mechanism meets the requirements discussed in
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Fig. 2: Illustration of locally centralized, globally distributed architecture of a SIoT system: figures under the dashed line depict
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Section I-A. We use the locally centralized, globally distributed archi-
tecture to show how a trustor can predict the most trustworthy
trustee for its requested service in a scalable and distributed
manner. As depicted in figure 2, we assume each SIoT object
is a member of a physical group which has a central node.
For example, considering a smart home as a group, it contains
not only lightweight objects such as smart light and smart
thermostat but also non-lightweight objects like smart TV and
Google Home assistant. Thus, these groups at least have one
non-lightweight node which could be selected as the central
node of its group. Also, since each group is owned by just one
individual or organization, all the SIoT objects in a group have
the same behavior as their owner does. So, it is not necessary
for all trustor nodes to perform matrix factorization themselves.
Instead, whenever nodes in a group need to select an external
service provider, the group leader (central node of the group)
collects prior experiences from the other nodes of the group
and also from other groups to perform the matrix factorization.
Then, the central node gives each node its related row from the
reconstructed bi-adjacency matrix B̂. In this way, each group is
locally centralized, but the whole system is globally distributed,
and the lightweight SIoT devices do not have to factorize any
matrices which is a heavy computational task or save any data
more than their own experiences.
As mentioned earlier, the mechanism of matrix factorization
intrinsically alleviates the data sparsity. We assume that each
node in SIoT has an identification number (like MAC address),
so its trust information could be saved along with its identifier.
Consequently, if a node decides to leave and/or rejoin the
network, its trust data will not be lost. Thus, our trust manage-
ment protocol deals with nodes which perform whitewashing
attack. Furthermore, it is obvious that selecting an appropriate
threshold for Hellinger distance will lead to construction of a
suitable network between trustors. This social network specifies
the friends of each node in such a way that bad behavior nodes
retire from the network, and none of the mentioned attacks (in
section I-A) could affect our prediction protocol. We will discuss
about the malicious nodes performing these attack in details in
the next section.
IV. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
trust management system in three different scenarios. First, we
investigate the quality of the matrix factorization mechanism.
Then, we follow the evaluation procedure outlined in [28], to
assess the performance of our trust management model. Finally,
we apply our trust management mechanism to a real-world SIoT
application in order to exhibit the utility of our protocol.
A. Accuracy of the Matrix Factorization Mechanism
To test the accuracy and quality of the matrix factorization
model, we have performed several experiments on the Epinions
dataset1. We also compare the proposed method with the best
existing trust prediction methods.
1) Dataset
Epinions.com is a well-known review website that was es-
tablished in 1999. Users can review products and assign them
integer ratings from 1 to 5. Users also express their Web of
Trust, i.e. each user maintains two lists of its trusted and blocked
users [71]. This part of the dataset is not used in our model
because this information is within privacy limits and is not
always in hand. Instead, we employ our Hellinger-based social
network, constructed only from the rating matrix. This dataset
consists of 922,267 ratings given by 22,166 users to 296,277
items, which leads to an extremely sparse rating matrix with
density percentage of 0.014. Figures 3 and 4 show the dataset
item-rating and user-rating distributions, respectively. The item-
rating distribution reveals that most of the items did not have
the chance to be seen by numerous users. Also, the user-rating
distribution unveils the fact that there are a few users who rate
too small or vast amount of items. On average, each user rates
41.607 times in her era. Figure 5 illustrates the users’ behavior
in conjunction with rating values. It implicitly shows that users
mostly give high rates to items.
2) Settings & Metrics
We used predictive accuracy and classification accuracy mea-
sures for evaluating the proposed matrix factorization method.
1www.cse.msu.edu/ tangjili/trust.html
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Fig. 5: Percentage of observed rates in Epinions dataset. User
preferences on items are displayed by a number ranging from
1 to 5.
Accuracy of a prediction system measures the closeness of the
methods predicted ratings to the true (actual) user ratings [72].
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) is the standard metric for comput-
ing predictive accuracy [73]. It measures the average absolute
deviation between the users true rating and the method’s pre-
dicted rating, as defined in:
MAE =
∑
i,j |Bprei,j − Bacti,j |
N
(13)
Where N is the number of nonzero elements in the rating matrix
Bact .
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is another popular predictive
accuracy metric. It is the square root of the average of squared
differences between true and predicted ratings, and is defined
as:
RMSE =
√∑
i,j |Bprei,j − Bacti,j |2
N
(14)
Where N is the number of nonzero elements in matrix Bact .
Although both MAE and RMSE express average prediction error,
RMSE can be more relevant in cases that large errors are intol-
erable. Whereas the errors are squared before they are averaged,
the RMSE gives higher weights to higher errors [74]. From the
Equations (13) and (14), we can observe that the smaller the value
of MAE or RMSE is, the higher the model performance (in terms
of accuracy) will be. For comparing with other methods, we use
RMSE, Coverage, Precision, and F-measure.
Coverage is the percentage of ratings which the method has
been able to generate predictions. Systems with higher coverage
are more advantageous, since there are more decisions they are
able to help with [72], [75]. Coverage can be defined as:
Coverage =
# ratings that system can make prediction
# available ratings (items) to predict
(15)
Precision, within this context, is associated with the normalized
form of RMSE and obtained as follows [76].
Precision = 1 − RMSE
RMSEmax
(16)
where RMSEmax is the maximum possible value for the RMSE
error.
F-measure is a harmonic mean of precision and coverage to
consider both metrics into a single evaluation metric. It is defined
as [76]:
F −measure = 2 × Precision ×Coverage
Precision +Coverage
(17)
The best desired setting for our algorithm can be achieved
when we set the size of latent features L to 4 and the parameters
α in Equation (10) and β in Equation (6) to 0.4 and 1, respectively.
We also use 75 percent of the Epinions data as the training set
and the rest of the instances for testing. The reason for picking
such values for the aforementioned parameters will be discussed
later in the subsequent sections. The hyper-parameters λS and
λR , in Equation (11), are set to 0.001 as proposed by [64], and
the maximum number of iterations for the stochastic gradient
descent phase was usually around 60.
3) Evaluation Results
Matrix factorization and the social trust model are employed
to predict the most trustworthy trustee for each trustor in the
SIoT. As described in Equation (10), trustor’s opinion about
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Fig. 6: MAE comparison of Epinions-based binary trust model,
Hellinger-based binary trust model, and our prediction
protocol; Also, MAE comparison between different similarity
measures, with fixed centrality, for different values of β.
a specific trustee relies on a linear function of both trustor’s
features and its friends’ features using a weighting factor α. The
lower the α is, the more impact of trustor’s friends will be on
trust prediction. According to Equation (6), the aforementioned
impact introduced as the linear combination of centrality of the
friends and similarity between them with the weighting factor
β. In Figures 6a and 6b, we analyze how the changes of β can
affect the prediction accuracy in terms of MAE measure. Also,
we introduce binary trust model and assess its MAE. Since both
the actual and the predicted rating could be between 1 and 5,
the maximum possible MAE is 4.
The binary trust model is a model that the similarity and
centrality of nodes do not affect the trust pattern similarity
between nodes, and just the friendship between nodes in the
social network is considered. That means, for the binary trust
model, Γ is equal to 1 in Equation (10). The magenta and light-
green straight dashdot lines in Figure 6 show the MAEs of
binary trust models using Hellinger-based users network and
Epinions dataset users network, respectively. As depicted in
Figure 6, MAE of our Hellinger-based binary trust is less than the
MAE of Epinions dataset binary trust model. This observation
specifies that the social network extracted based on our proposed
Hellinger distance provides valuable information about trustors
connections and their trust behavior. Moreover, our prediction
mechanism based on trust pattern similarity, regardless of which
centrality and similarity measures it uses, outperforms both bi-
nary trust models. In both figures, which contain all the different
combinations of similarities and centralities, it is shown that by
increasing the β value, consequently by decreasing the impact
of user centralities, the accuracy of prediction protocol strictly
increases. It illustrates that considering nodes’ centrality does not
help the prediction mechanism. Furthermore, separation of Fig-
ure 6a from Figure 6b gives a better sight of similarity measures
differences, irrespective of centrality measures. Comparison of
similarity measures in combination with both degree and BLC
centrality measures shows that the connection similarity has the
worst MAE by increasing β, and Hellinger similarity has the least
MAE with both centrality measures.
Figure 7 restates the efficiency of the proposed prediction
method for different values of β, separated by similarity mea-
sure. This figure demonstrates that BLC centrality, which is a
local measure, is more suitable to show trust pattern similarity
than degree centrality; because in higher centrality values (i.e.
lower β), degree-based MAE is higher than BLC-based MAE.
According to Figure 7 and Equation (6), our prediction pro-
tocol with β = 1 has the lowest error compared to the binary
trust model and centrality based prediction (β = 0), without the
impact of similarity. It affirms that incorporating nodes’ simi-
larities significantly enhance the effectiveness of the prediction
mechanism.
In Figure 8, we got very similar behavior for our prediction
mechanism in terms of RMSE measure, as analogous to MAE
figures. This indicates that the results are consistent.
In order to analyze how much node’s friends might affect
the prediction protocol, one can leverage the idea of the Elbow
method, which is designed to help finding the best number of
clusters in Clustering Analysis, to find the best value of α in
Equation (10). In Figure 9, we can see that until α = 0.4, the
gradients of both lines are high, but from there on, adding to
α does not help the precision much more. Hence, α = 0.4 is
selected as the best setting.
As depicted in Figure 10, increasing latent features size im-
proves the accuracy of our prediction, however it imposes extra
overhead because of larger latent feature matrices. According
to the application of prediction protocol, one can select the
appropriate latent feature size by trades off between more ac-
curacy and light-weight process. Since it seems that the testing
error reaches its expected (true) error value at L = 4, which is
not too large to cause intolerable overhead, we use this value
(L = 4) to learn l-deminsional (trustors and trustees) latent
feature matrices.
Figure 11 shows that using more training data generally
improves the precision of the prediction, which is somehow
obvious. In general, there is not an approved ratio (percentage)
for division of training versus testing sets. Less testing data
results in non-generalized model (i.e. high variance). On the
other hand, less training data causes that training loss no longer
bears relation to test loss (high bias) and brings overfitting
problem. However, this problem becomes less severe when the
size of training data increases. Therefore, between 90:10, 80:20,
and 75:25 splits, we chose 75:25 split, since our dataset is large
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Fig. 7: MAE comparison between different centrality measures, with fixed similarity, for different values of β.
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values of β. It results the similar outcome as MAE-based
figures.
enough.
Figure 12 shows the true (actual) versus estimated ratings
of the prediction model. This figure shows the upper (and
lower) extreme, upper (and lower) quartile, median, and mean of
estimated rating for each actual rating. We can see that estimated
values aggregate near the true values. Moreover, the mean and
median of estimated values are not more than one unit far from
the actual values.
In order to show the effectiveness of our prediction method
in comparison with the best existing methods, we evaluate the
methods in terms of RMSE, coverage, precision, and F-measure.
To the extent of our knowledge, there is not any other IoT/SIoT
trust management model, which utilizes matrix factorization
related mechanism. Therefore, we compared our method with
relevant social network methods. The best existing methods in
the literature for comparison are (1) Item-based [77], (2) SoRec
[78], (3) TrustWalker [76], (4) Similarity-based [41], (5) Centrality-
based [41], and (6) SocialTieTrust [42].
As it is depicted in Figure 13, our method clearly provides
very low RMSE, since the other methods have very higher
RMSE. SocialTieTrust, the second-best method in terms of RMSE,
has 0.31 more RMSE than our method. As Koren states in
[79], even small improvement in RMSE could have significant
enhancements. Since for all competing methods, RMSEmax is
equal to 4, and according to the combination of RMSE and
RMSEmax , our method is selected as the best candidate in
terms of precision. SocialTieTrust and TrustWalker are the second
and third best methods, respectively, with slight differences (in
terms of precision). Our method advantageous is achieved by
considering Hellinger-based social network of trustors as well as
using inversion of Hellinger distance as the similarity measure.
Moreover, our proposed method’s coverage is 100%, that is
the best coverage a prediction mechanism can provide. Other
methods, except for TrustWalker and Item-based, provides 100%
coverage too. Eventually, our proposed method outperforms all
the other competing methods in terms of F-measure. These
aforementioned results appear to be the ideal ones among all
the previously obtained results. Therefore, we may conclude
that the implicit social information from Hellinger distance can
be incorporated into matrix factorization to perform predictions
effectively.
B. Trust Protocol Performance
As we mentioned in Section II, there are few trust management
methods which we can compare our method with. Hence, we
follow the same simulation evaluation strategy as in [28] which is
one of the most noteworthy works in the SIoT trust management
literature. Our goal is to investigate the performance of our trust
management mechanism using the best setting as analysed in
the previous subsection and the two best centrality-similarity
measurement pairs, BLC-Bayesian and BLC-Hellinger, as shown
in Figure (8), in a hostile SIoT environment.
1) Settings & Metrics
We conducted several experiments through 150 hours simula-
tion to validate the convergence, accuracy, and attack resiliency
properties. For determining the interaction-contact time, the
simulation interaction pattern follows a bounded power-law
distribution ranging between [10 mins, 2 days] with the slope
equals to 1.4 which leads to about 4 hours interaction-contact
time. It is worth noting that this setting is close to real traces
generated in [80].
We consider a SIoT environment with maliciousness factor
λ ∈ [10%, 50%] which will be selected randomly in each simu-
lation execution. The maliciousness factor λ indicates the per-
centage of malicious nodes relative to all nodes. A malicious
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node can perform any kind of attacks, addressed in section I-A.
Our SIoT simulation environment consists of 70 trustees and 100
trustors to which form 14 and 20 physical groups, respectively.
Although SIoT nodes can leave or join the SIoT network anytime,
the number of things remains fixed throughout the simulation.
During the simulation, the trustor groups form a social net-
work of trustors as explained in Section III-B, then perform the
matrix factorization mechanism and predict missing values of
the bi-adjacency matrix B as detailed in Section III-D every 24
hours. We believe that performing matrix factorization once a
day (i.e. every 24 hours) is not computationally a heavy task, also
the trust management system does not need to perform it more
frequently. Each SIoT node has an objective (ground) trustwor-
thiness value in the interval [1, 5] which specified randomly with
respect to the level of its malicious behavior at the beginning of
the simulation. For example, malicious nodes receive objective
trustworthiness values closer to minimum of the interval (i.e.
1), and non-malicious nodes acquire objective trustworthiness
values near maximum of the interval (i.e. 5). The trustworthiness
value of SIoT nodes remains unchanged during the simulation
except for malicious nodes which perform opportunistic service
attack. Still, we permit the SIoT nodes to change their behavior
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Fig. 13: Comparison of our method using best setting (BLC as
centrality, Hellinger as similarity, L = 4, α = 0.4, and β = 1)
with other methods in terms of RMSE, coverage, precision, and
F-measure
(trustworthiness value) ±0.3 of one unit randomly in order
to simulate the behavior tolerance of actual SIoT devices. As
mentioned earlier in Section I-A, trustors measure and rate
the trustworthiness of trustees based on the past service usage
experiences. This rating scales between 1 and 5 and would be
maintained to benefit the future decisions. Our proposed trust
management mechanism set the initial trustworthiness of all
SIoT nodes to middle of it’s range (i.e. 3).
2) Evaluation Results
This subsection first investigates the effect of β, similar-
ity/centrality contribution parameter, on trustworthiness eval-
uation operation. Then, changes to the similarity method will
be studied, and hostility changes will be examined finally. In
this experiment, we analyses the performance of our selected
mechanisms through trust evaluation results of trustor nodes
toward three trustee nodes randomly picked from a 30% hostile
SIoT environment. The first trustee node is a non-malicious
node which its objective trustworthiness is equal to 4.5 (out of
[1, 5]). The second and third trustees are malicious nodes. The
former malicious node does not perform opportunistic service
attack, and it’s trustworthiness value remains fixed on 1.5. But,
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(b) Trustworthiness evaluation using L = 4, α = 0.4, β = 1, BLC as
centrality measure, and Bayesian and Hellinger as similarity measure
Fig. 14: Effect of β and centrality-similarity measures on our trust management trustworthiness evaluation of a randomly picked
benign trustee
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(a) Trustworthiness evaluation using L = 4, α = 0.4, β = 0.5, BLC as
centrality measure, and Bayesian and Hellinger as similarity measure
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(b) Trustworthiness evaluation using L = 4, α = 0.4, β = 1, BLC as
centrality measure, and Bayesian and Hellinger as similarity measure
Fig. 15: Effect of β and centrality-similarity measures on our trust management trustworthiness evaluation of a randomly picked
malicious trustee (not performing opportunistic service attack)
the latter performs opportunistic service attack and its objective
trustworthiness value decreases from 4.5 to 2.5 in the middle of
the simulation.
Figure 14 shows trustworthiness evaluation toward a non-
malicious node. The colorless area around lines exhibits the
empirical confidence intervals with 90% confidence. The trust-
worthiness value of trustors toward this trustee node starts at 3
and approximates to 4.5, which is the benign trustee’s trustwor-
thiness value. Predictably, BLC-Bayesian setting converges with
more confidence and faster with β = 0.5, also, BLC-Hellinger
performs better with β = 1 as expected from Figures 6 and
8. Furthermore, we observe that as trustworthiness converges,
it fluctuates around the objective trustworthiness with more
confidence.
Figure 15 demonstrates trustworthiness evaluation toward a
random malicious node which does not perform opportunistic
service attack. As it should, the trustworthiness value decreases
to approach the objective value. Again, we can observe that BLC-
Bayesian setting performs better with β = 0.5 and also, BLC-
Hellinger with β = 1. However, the difference between the two
similarity settings, Bayesian and Hellinger, is not so significant.
The other phenomenon that attracts our attention is that the
mechanism underestimates the trustworthiness value just after
it reaches the objective trustworthiness. The reason for this phe-
nomenon is that trustors do not trust and use malicious trustees
just after the trustworthiness values decrease, so no further
usage experience affects the trustworthiness value, but matrix
factorization mechanism still reduces the trustworthiness value
due to trustors’ past experiences. Figure 15b shows 20 hours of
low confidence since t = 55 for BLC-Bayesian setting. This case
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(a) Trustworthiness evaluation using L = 4, α = 0.4, β = 0.5, BLC as
centrality measure, and Bayesian and Hellinger as similarity measure
                         
 ȫ Ⱥ Ⱦ ȶ   ȹ ɀ Ɇ Ƀ 
   
   
   
   
   
 ȫ Ƀ
 Ɇ Ʉ
 Ʌ Ɉ
 ɀ Ƀ
 Ʌ ȹ
 Ⱥ ȿ
 ȶ Ʉ
 Ʉ  ȭ
 Ȳ Ƚ Ɇ
 ȶ
 * U R X Q G  7 U X V W Z R U W K L Q H V V
 % / &  % D \ H V L D Q
 % / &  + H O O L Q J H U
(b) Trustworthiness evaluation using L = 4, α = 0.4, β = 1, BLC as
centrality measure, and Bayesian and Hellinger as similarity measure
Fig. 16: Effect of β and centrality-similarity measures on our trust management trustworthiness evaluation of a randomly picked
malicious trustee (performing opportunistic service attack)
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(a) Trustworthiness evaluation
using L = 4, α = 0.4, BLC-Bayesian
as centrality-similarity measure,
and different β setting
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(b) Trustworthiness evaluation
using L = 4, α = 0.4, BLC-Hellinger
as centrality-similarity measure,
and different β setting
Fig. 17: Effect of centrality-similarity and β measures on our
trust management trustworthiness evaluation of a randomly
picked benign trustee
happened adventitiously and has no meaningful implication.
Figure 16 demonstrates trustworthiness evaluation toward an
(malicious) opportunistic service attacker. Convergence rates of
different settings are as we expected from the previous part.
Although the convergence speed and confidence became lower
after the malicious node changed its behavior, we can see that
our protocol can proficiently track the trustworthiness value of
the malicious trustee. The reason for high fluctuation after t = 75
is that the system gets confused about the behavior changing,
but after about 45 hours, the procedure will be monotonically
decreasing.
Figures 17, 18, and 19 presents another view of figures 14, 15,
and 16. We put different β settings together in order to show
that the setting with β = 1 has lower MAE error and performs
better than β = 0.5 which means that for computing trustors’
trust pattern similarity, trustors’ similarity is more important
than trustors’ centrality, in a hostile SIoT environment. Our
experiment in Section IV-A with Epinions dataset also consol-
idates these results. These figures demonstrate that our trust
management mechanism is efficient in terms of both convergence
and accuracy.
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(a) Trustworthiness evaluation
using L = 4, α = 0.4, BLC-Bayesian
as centrality-similarity measure,
and different β setting
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(b) Trustworthiness evaluation
using L = 4, α = 0.4, BLC-Hellinger
as centrality-similarity measure,
and different β setting
Fig. 18: Effect of centrality-similarity and β measures on our
trust management trustworthiness evaluation of a randomly
picked malicious trustee (not performing opportunistic service
attack)
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(a) Trustworthiness evaluation
using L = 4, α = 0.4, BLC-Bayesian
as centrality-similarity measure,
and different β setting
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(b) Trustworthiness evaluation
using L = 4, α = 0.4, BLC-Hellinger
as centrality-similarity measure,
and different β setting
Fig. 19: Effect of centrality-similarity and β measures on our
trust management trustworthiness evaluation of a randomly
picked malicious trustee (performing opportunistic service
attack)
13
                         
 ȫ Ⱥ Ⱦ ȶ   ȹ ɀ Ɇ Ƀ 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
 ȫ Ƀ
 Ɇ Ʉ
 Ʌ Ɉ
 ɀ Ƀ
 Ʌ ȹ
 Ⱥ ȿ
 ȶ Ʉ
 Ʉ  ȭ
 Ȳ Ƚ Ɇ
 ȶ
 * U R X Q G  7 U X V W Z R U W K L Q H V V
       
       
       
(a) Toward a benign trustee
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(b) Toward a malicious trustee (not performing opportunistic service
attack)
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(c) Toward a malicious trustee (performing opportunistic service attack)
Fig. 20: Effect of malicious factor λ on our trust management
(trustworthiness evaluation) efficiency using our best setting
(BLC as centrality, Hellinger as similarity, L = 4, α = 0.4, and
β = 1)
Next, we investigate the effect of malicious factor λ on our
mechanism efficiency. For sensitivity analysis, we change the
SIoT environment hostility from low hostile (λ = 10%) to a very
hostile environment (λ = 50%). Figures 20a to 20c demonstrate
the trustworthiness value of trustors toward randomly picked
trustees as mentioned before through our best trust management
mechanism setting which utilizes Hellinger as the similarity and
no effect of centrality (β = 1).
Figure 20a is trustworthiness evaluation toward a benign
trustee. We can see that all three lines approach to the (trustee’s)
objective trustworthiness value. However, we observe that the
green line falls down excessively at t = 75, because of lots of
malicious nodes which perform opportunistic service attack and
change their behavior that time, but then it keeps on converg-
ing to the objective trustworthiness value, as we expected. An
interesting observation in Figure 20a is that for λ = 10%, our
proposed trust management overestimated the trustworthiness
value of a trustee, however, it does not estimates the value,
greater than trustworthiness value of more trusted nodes. As
mentioned in [81], trust overshoot destroys the stability of the
trust management system. Indeed, the trust management system
preserves the order of trustees in terms of their trustworthiness
values (among the network nodes).
Moreover, Figure 20 indicates that our trustworthiness eval-
uation mechanism converges toward a trustee’s objective trust-
worthiness accurate, yet quick. We can see that our mechanism
confidence and convergence rate are higher in a less hostile
environment. But, as the malicious factor increases, the protocol
is still acceptable. These results demonstrate our mechanism’s
high resiliency toward various attacks even in a highly hostile
SIoT environment.
C. SIoT Application Performance
This section evaluates the effectiveness of our proposed trust
management mechanism through a real-world SIoT application
[82], [83]. We aim to run such a scenario on top of our protocol in
order to validate its robustness against the cold start problem. We
compare the performance of our system with a random system in
which trustors select their service providers among all available
trustees randomly.
1) Settings & Metrics
We consider a smart city in which people benefit from smart
health-care systems. In addition, individuals may have health-
care applications installed on their mobile phones. Providing
air air pollution information for individuals who suffer from
respiratory (breathing) diseases is one of the applications of
this health-care system. We consider Alice, who is a respiratory
patient, and wants to go jogging. Alice’s doctor advises her not
to get into polluted areas. So she let her smartphone connect
to sensor devices in an area she is about to step into and
alert her if any air pollution detected. She knows that there
are many malicious and imperfect SIoT sensors which provide
wrong or inaccurate data. Besides, her smartphone as a trustor
is entirely strange in the environment that she runs in, so it
needs to decide which of those new trustees are reliable. This
situation causes the cold start problem for the trustor (Alice’s
smartphone). We assume that the whole SIoT system utilizes our
trust management mechanism with the best setting described in
the last section. We want to analyze how her smartphone behaves
in this situation.
2) Evaluation Results
Figure 21 compares our mechanism against a random method
which picks trustees randomly and without considering the
trustees’ trustworthiness value. We classify trustees by their
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Fig. 21: Performance comparison of our proposed trust
management, using its best setting, versus a random system in
a real-world SIoT application scenario. Y-axis shows ground
trustworthiness values that represent trustee groups, and X-axis
shows the number of times that each system selects each group.
The numbers on bars show the order of selecting each group.
objective trustworthiness values into 9 groups. Figure 21 shows
how many times each group has been used by Alice’s smart-
phone. We can see that at the beginning of the simulation
the trustor experiments various trustees to learn about their
behaviors (objective trustworthiness values), then it keeps using
most trustworthy trustees which has objective trustworthiness
equals 4 or 4.5. Also, it is depicted that the group with ground
trustworthiness equals 5 utilized just one time out of 20. The
reason is that there is just one trustee in such a perfect group,
and Alice’s smartphone did not discover it until the last minutes
of the simulation. One can conclude that our mechanism suc-
cessfully helps trustors to detect and exploit most trustworthy
trustees, and definitely outperforms the random model even for
newcomer nodes (i.e., cold start situations).
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel trust management mech-
anism in SIoT. We employed Hellinger distance to build a
social network of trustors. The social relations in the network
shows behavioral trust similarity among network nodes. The
trustworthiness value of trustees predicted using both trustor’s
experience and its friends’ feedbacks (analogous to recommen-
dations). In order to utilize the feedbacks, we designed a social
trust model, using centrality and similarity measures. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the first paper using matrix factor-
ization technique to predict trustworthiness values of trustees
in SIoT. Our proposed mechanism is globally distributed and
considers the data sparsity problems and resource-constraint of
IoT devices. We demonstrated the effectiveness of our prediction
mechanism by evaluating its accuracy using different settings.
We found that the best accuracy occurs when we use inversion
of Hellinger distance as the similarity measure in our proposed
social trust model, without considering the impact of centrality.
Then we compared our prediction mechanism with the best
existing methods in the social network literature and the results
showed the superiority of our proposed method in terms of
RMSE, coverage, precision, and F-measure. To investigate the
applicability of our trust management mechanism, we evaluated
the convergence, accuracy, and attack resiliency properties of
different settings of our mechanism in a hostile SIoT environ-
ment. Our simulation results demonstrated that our proposed
mechanism accurately converges to the trustee’s ground trust-
worthiness value and resists the malicious nodes (performing
different types of attacks). We have further shown the util-
ity of our proposed trust management mechanism through a
real-world SIoT application. The simulation showed that our
proposed mechanism is successful in helping trustors in order
to find trustworthy trustees. Also, it certainly outperforms the
random model and mitigates the cold start problems.
As future work, we plan to model the SIoT with hypergraphs,
because we have found that by representing some social relations
with naive edges (in traditional graphs), we may lose some
information [84]–[87]. From the experience of this paper, we
believe that finding more meaningful and deeper social relations
between SIoT nodes helps us to understand their trust pattern
similarities better.
References
[1] D. Giusto, A. Iera, G. Morabito, and L. Atzori, The Internet of Things:
20th Tyrrhenian Workshop on Digital Communications, 2010.
[2] L. Atzori, A. Iera, G. Morabito, and M. Nitti, “The social internet
of things (siot) when social networks meet the internet of things:
Concept, architecture and network characterization,” Computer Net-
works, vol. 56, no. 16, pp. 3594 – 3608, 2012.
[3] R. Khan, S. U. Khan, R. Zaheer, and S. Khan, “Future internet:
The internet of things architecture, possible applications and key
challenges,” in 2012 10th International Conference on Frontiers of
Information Technology, Dec 2012, pp. 257–260.
[4] I. Ud Din, M. Guizani, B. Kim, S. Hassan, and M. Khurram Khan,
“Trust management techniques for the internet of things: A survey,”
IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 29 763–29 787, 2019.
[5] J. Gubbi, R. Buyya, S. Marusic, and M. Palaniswami, “Internet of
things (iot): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions,”
Future Generation Computer Systems, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 1645 – 1660,
2013.
[6] S. Vashi, J. Ram, J. Modi, S. Verma, and C. Prakash, “Internet of
things (iot): A vision, architectural elements, and security issues,”
in 2017 International Conference on I-SMAC (IoT in Social, Mobile,
Analytics and Cloud) (I-SMAC), Feb 2017, pp. 492–496.
[7] U. S. Premarathne, “Mag-siot: A multiplicative attributes graph
model based trust computation method for social internet of
things,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Industrial and In-
formation Systems (ICIIS), Dec 2017, pp. 1–6.
[8] L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, “From ”smart objects” to ”social
objects”: The next evolutionary step of the internet of things,” IEEE
Communications Magazine, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 97–105, 2014.
[9] D. Artz and Y. Gil, “A survey of trust in computer science and the
semantic web,” Journal of Web Semantics, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 58 – 71,
2007.
[10] S. Sicari, A. Rizzardi, L. Grieco, and A. Coen-Porisini, “Security,
privacy and trust in internet of things: The road ahead,” Computer
Networks, vol. 76, pp. 146 – 164, 2015.
[11] V. Sharma, I. You, D. N. K. Jayakody, and M. Atiquzzaman,
“Cooperative trust relaying and privacy preservation via edge-
crowdsourcing in social internet of things,” Future Generation Com-
puter Systems, vol. 92, pp. 758 – 776, 2019.
[12] Z. Lin and L. Dong, “Clarifying trust in social internet of things,”
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 30, no. 2,
pp. 234–248, 2018.
[13] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and A. V. Vasilakos, “A survey on trust man-
agement for internet of things,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 42, pp. 120 – 134, 2014.
[14] C. V. L. Mendoza and J. H. Kleinschmidt, “A distributed trust
management mechanism for the internet of things using a multi-
service approach,” Wireless Personal Communications, vol. 103, no. 3,
pp. 2501–2513, 2018.
[15] A. Al-Fuqaha, M. Guizani, M. Mohammadi, M. Aledhari, and
M. Ayyash, “Internet of things: A survey on enabling technologies,
protocols, and applications,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials,
vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 2347–2376, 2015.
15
[16] H. Kim, “Securing the internet of things via locally centralized,
globally distributed authentication and authorization,” Ph.D. dis-
sertation, UC Berkeley, 2017.
[17] J. Daubert, A. Wiesmaier, and P. Kikiras, “A view on privacy
trust in iot,” in 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communication
Workshop (ICCW), June 2015, pp. 2665–2670.
[18] S. Hilton, “Dyn analysis summary of friday october 21 attack,” 2016.
[19] I. Chen, F. Bao, and J. Guo, “Trust-based service management for
social internet of things systems,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable
and Secure Computing, vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 684–696, 2016.
[20] J. Guo, I.-R. Chen, and J. J. Tsai, “A survey of trust computation
models for service management in internet of things systems,”
Computer Communications, vol. 97, pp. 1 – 14, 2017.
[21] M. Nitti, R. Girau, and L. Atzori, “Trustworthiness management in
the social internet of things,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and
Data Engineering, vol. 26, no. 5, pp. 1253–1266, 2014.
[22] N. S. Nizamkari, “A graph-based trust-enhanced recommender
system for service selection in iot,” in 2017 International Conference
on Inventive Systems and Control (ICISC), Jan 2017, pp. 1–5.
[23] B. Kantarci and H. T. Mouftah, “Trustworthy sensing for public
safety in cloud-centric internet of things,” IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 360–368, 2014.
[24] D. Chen, G. Chang, D. Sun, J. Li, J. Jia, and X. Wang, “Trm-iot: A
trust management model based on fuzzy reputation for internet of
things,” Computer Science and Information Systems, no. 20, pp. 1207–
1228, 2011.
[25] M. Imran, S. Jabbar, N. Chilamkurti, and J. J. Rodrigues, “Enabling
technologies for social internet of things,” Future Generation Com-
puter Systems, vol. 92, pp. 715 – 717, 2019.
[26] B. Yu, J. Wright, S. Nepal, L. Zhu, J. Liu, and R. Ranjan,
“Iotchain: Establishing trust in the internet of things ecosystem
using blockchain,” IEEE Cloud Computing, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 12–23,
2018.
[27] H. Xiao, N. Sidhu, and B. Christianson, “Guarantor and reputation
based trust model for social internet of things,” in 2015 International
Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC),
Aug 2015, pp. 600–605.
[28] I. Chen, J. Guo, and F. Bao, “Trust management for soa-based iot
and its application to service composition,” IEEE Transactions on
Services Computing, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 482–495, 2016.
[29] S. M. Taheri, H. Mahyar, M. Firouzi, E. Ghalebi K., R. Grosu, and
A. Movaghar, “Hellrank: a hellinger-based centrality measure for
bipartite social networks,” Social Network Analysis and Mining, vol. 7,
no. 1, p. 22, 2017.
[30] ——, “Extracting implicit social relation for social recommendation
techniques in user rating prediction,” in Proceedings of the 26th
International Conference on World Wide Web Companion, Republic and
Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, 2017, pp. 1343–1351.
[31] G. Guo, J. Zhang, and N. Yorke-Smith, “A novel bayesian similarity
measure for recommender systems,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-
Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2013, pp.
2619–2625.
[32] M. Nikulin, “Hellinger distance. hazewinkel, michiel, encyclopedia
of mathematics,” Springer, Berlin. doi, vol. 10, pp. 1 361 684–1 361 686,
2001.
[33] J. Golbeck, “Trust and nuanced profile similarity in online social
networks,” ACM Trans. Web, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 12:1–12:33, 2009.
[34] X. Zheng, Y. Wang, M. A. Orgun, Y. Zhong, and G. Liu, “Trust
prediction with propagation and similarity regularization,” in Pro-
ceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2014, pp. 237–243.
[35] Y. Dong, C. Zhao, W. Cheng, L. Li, and L. Liu, “A personalized
recommendation algorithm with user trust in social network,” in
Social Computing, Singapore, 2016, pp. 63–76.
[36] Ye, Li, Wu, Chunming, and Li, Min, “Collaborative filtering recom-
mendation based on trust model with fused similar factor,” MATEC
Web Conf., vol. 139, p. 00010, 2017.
[37] M. Siegrist, G. Cvetkovich, and C. Roth, “Salient value similarity,
social trust, and risk/benefit perception,” Risk Analysis, vol. 20,
no. 3, pp. 353–362, 2000.
[38] H. Ma, I. King, and M. R. Lyu, “Effective missing data prediction for
collaborative filtering,” in Proceedings of the 30th Annual International
ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information
Retrieval, New York, NY, USA, 2007, pp. 39–46.
[39] H. J. Ahn, “A new similarity measure for collaborative filtering to
alleviate the new user cold-starting problem,” Information Sciences,
vol. 178, no. 1, pp. 37 – 51, 2008.
[40] S. Wang, J. Sun, B. J. Gao, and J. Ma, “Vsrank: A novel framework
for ranking-based collaborative filtering,” ACM Trans. Intell. Syst.
Technol., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 51:1–51:24, 2014.
[41] A. Davoudi and M. Chatterjee, “Modeling trust for rating prediction
in recommender systems,” in SIAM Workshop on Machine Learning
Methods for Recommender Systems, SIAM, 2016, pp. 1–8.
[42] ——, “Social trust model for rating prediction in recommender
systems: Effects of similarity, centrality, and social ties,” Online Social
Networks and Media, vol. 7, pp. 1 – 11, 2018.
[43] H. Mahyar, “Detection of top-k central nodes in social networks: A
compressive sensing approach,” in Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and
Mining 2015, New York, NY, USA, 2015, pp. 902–909.
[44] H. Mahyar, E. Ghalebi K., H. R. Rabiee, and R. Grosu, “The
bottlenecks in biological networks,” in ICML, Comp Bio Workshop,
Sydney, Australia, August 2017, pp. 1–5.
[45] H. Mahyar, R. Hasheminezhad, E. Ghalebi, A. Nazemian, R. Grosu,
A. Movaghar, and H. R. Rabiee, “Identifying central nodes for
information flow in social networks using compressive sensing,”
Social Network Analysis and Mining, vol. 8, p. 33, 2018.
[46] V. Buskens, “The social structure of trust,” Social Networks, vol. 20,
no. 3, pp. 265 – 289, 1998.
[47] W. Tsai and S. Ghoshal, “Social capital and value creation: The role
of intrafirm networks,” Academy of Management Journal, vol. 41, no. 4,
pp. 464–476, 1998.
[48] J.-D. Luo, “Particularistic trust and general trust: A network analysis
in chinese organizations,” Management and Organization Review,
vol. 1, no. 3, p. 437458, 2005.
[49] H. Mahyar, R. Hasheminezhad, E. Ghalebi, R. Grosu, and H. E. Stan-
ley, “A compressive sensing framework for distributed detection of
high closeness centrality nodes in networks,” in Complex Networks
and Their Applications VII, Cham, 2019, pp. 91–103.
[50] E. Ghalebi, H. Mahyar, R. Grosu, and H. R. Rabiee, “Compressive
sampling for sparse recovery in networks,” in Proceedings of the 13th
International Workshop on Mining and Learning with Graphs (MLG),
August 2017.
[51] H. Mahyar, H. R. Rabiee, and Z. S. Hashemifar, “Ucs-nt: An un-
biased compressive sensing framework for network tomography,”
in 2013 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal
Processing, May 2013, pp. 4534–4538.
[52] H. Mahyar, H. R. Rabiee, A. Movaghar, R. Hasheminezhad,
E. Ghalebi, and A. Nazemian, “A low-cost sparse recovery frame-
work for weighted networks under compressive sensing,” in 2015
IEEE International Conference on Smart City/SocialCom/SustainCom
(SmartCity), Dec 2015, pp. 183–190.
[53] H. Mahyar, H. R. Rabieey, Z. S. Hashemifar, and P. Siyari, “Ucs-
wn: An unbiased compressive sensing framework for weighted
networks,” in 2013 47th Annual Conference on Information Sciences
and Systems (CISS), March 2013, pp. 1–6.
[54] C. Tong, J. Niu, B. Dai, and X. Zhongyu, “A novel complex net-
works clustering algorithm based on the core influence of nodes,”
TheScientificWorldJournal, vol. 2014, p. 801854, 2014.
[55] H. Mahyar, R. Hasheminezhad, E. Ghalebi K., A. Nazemian,
R. Grosu, A. Movaghar, and H. R. Rabiee, “Compressive sensing
of high betweenness centrality nodes in networks,” Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 497, pp. 166 – 184, 2018.
[56] H. Mahyar, H. R. Rabiee, A. Movaghar, E. Ghalebi, and
A. Nazemian, “Cs-comdet: A compressive sensing approach for
inter-community detection in social networks,” in Proceedings of
the 2015 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in Social
Networks Analysis and Mining 2015, New York, NY, USA, 2015, pp.
89–96.
[57] A. Davoudi and M. Chatterjee, “Product rating prediction using
trust relationships in social networks,” in 2016 13th IEEE Annual
Consumer Communications Networking Conference (CCNC), Jan 2016,
pp. 115–118.
[58] R. Bell, Y. Koren, and C. Volinsky, “Matrix factorization techniques
for recommender systems,” Computer, vol. 42, no. 08, pp. 30–37,
2009.
[59] D. M. Dunlavy, T. G. Kolda, and E. Acar, “Temporal link prediction
using matrix and tensor factorizations,” ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov.
Data, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 10:1–10:27, Feb. 2011.
[60] J. Yang and J. Leskovec, “Overlapping community detection at scale:
A nonnegative matrix factorization approach,” in Proceedings of the
Sixth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining,
New York, NY, USA, 2013, pp. 587–596.
[61] H. Wang, N. Wang, and D.-Y. Yeung, “Collaborative deep learning
for recommender systems,” in Proceedings of the 21th ACM SIGKDD
16
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
New York, NY, USA, 2015, pp. 1235–1244.
[62] X. He, H. Zhang, M.-Y. Kan, and T.-S. Chua, “Fast matrix fac-
torization for online recommendation with implicit feedback,” in
Proceedings of the 39th International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research
and Development in Information Retrieval, New York, NY, USA, 2016,
pp. 549–558.
[63] H. Ma, M. R. Lyu, and I. King, “Learning to recommend with
trust and distrust relationships,” in Proceedings of the Third ACM
Conference on Recommender Systems, New York, NY, USA, 2009, pp.
189–196.
[64] H. Ma, D. Zhou, C. Liu, M. R. Lyu, and I. King, “Recommender
systems with social regularization,” in Proceedings of the Fourth ACM
International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, New York,
NY, USA, 2011, pp. 287–296.
[65] B. Yang, Y. Lei, J. Liu, and W. Li, “Social collaborative filtering by
trust,” IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence,
vol. 39, no. 8, pp. 1633–1647, 2017.
[66] B. Sarwar, G. Karypis, J. Konstan, and J. Riedl, Application of
Dimensionality Reduction in Recommender System - A Case Study.
minnesota univ minneapolis Department of computer science, 2000.
[67] K. Goldberg, T. Roeder, D. Gupta, and C. Perkins, “Eigentaste:
A constant time collaborative filtering algorithm,” Information Re-
trieval, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 133–151, 2001.
[68] R. Salakhutdinov and A. Mnih, “Probabilistic matrix factorization,”
in Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems, USA, 2007, pp. 1257–1264.
[69] D. Lee and H. Sebastian Seung, “Learning the parts of objects
by non-negative matrix factorization,” Nature, vol. 401, pp. 788–91,
1999.
[70] H. Ma, I. King, and M. R. Lyu, “Learning to recommend with ex-
plicit and implicit social relations,” ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol.,
vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 29:1–29:19, 2011.
[71] P. Massa and P. Avesani, “Controversial users demand local trust
metrics: An experimental study on epinions.com community,” in
Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence -
Volume 1, 01 2005, pp. 121–126.
[72] J. L. Herlocker, J. A. Konstan, L. G. Terveen, and J. T. Riedl,
“Evaluating collaborative filtering recommender systems,” ACM
Trans. Inf. Syst., vol. 22, pp. 5–53, 2004.
[73] J. B. Schafer, D. Frankowski, J. Herlocker, and S. Sen, Collaborative
Filtering Recommender Systems. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 291–324.
[74] T. Chai and R. R. Draxler, “Root mean square error (rmse) or mean
absolute error (mae)? arguments against avoiding rmse in the
literature,” Geoscientific Model Development, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 1247–
1250, 2014.
[75] S. Vargas, L. Baltrunas, A. Karatzoglou, and P. Castells, “Coverage,
redundancy and size-awareness in genre diversity for recommender
systems,” in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Recommender
Systems, New York, NY, USA, 2014, pp. 209–216.
[76] M. Jamali and M. Ester, “Trustwalker: A random walk model
for combining trust-based and item-based recommendation,” in
Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, New York, NY, USA, 2009,
pp. 397–406.
[77] B. Sarwar, G. Karypis, J. Konstan, and J. Riedl, “Item-based collab-
orative filtering recommendation algorithms,” Proceedings of ACM
World Wide Web Conference, vol. 1, 08 2001.
[78] H. Ma, H. Yang, M. R. Lyu, and I. King, “Sorec: Social recommen-
dation using probabilistic matrix factorization,” in Proceedings of the
17th ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, New
York, NY, USA, 2008, pp. 931–940.
[79] Y. Koren, “Factor in the neighbors: Scalable and accurate collabo-
rative filtering,” ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data, vol. 4, no. 1, pp.
1:1–1:24, 2010.
[80] T. Karagiannis, J. Le Boudec, and M. Vojnovic, “Power law and
exponential decay of intercontact times between mobile devices,”
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 9, no. 10, pp. 1377–1390,
2010.
[81] J.-H. Cho, A. Swami, and R. Chen, “Modeling and analysis of
trust management with trust chain optimization in mobile ad hoc
networks,” Journal of Network and Computer Applications, vol. 35,
no. 3, pp. 1001 – 1012, 2012.
[82] L. Atzori, A. Iera, and G. Morabito, “The internet of things: A
survey,” Computer Networks, vol. 54, no. 15, pp. 2787 – 2805, 2010.
[83] E. Borgia, “The internet of things vision: Key features, applications
and open issues,” Computer Communications, vol. 54, pp. 1 – 31, 2014.
[84] D. Zhou, J. Huang, and B. Scho¨lkopf, “Learning with hypergraphs:
Clustering, classification, and embedding,” in Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems 19. Cambridge, MA, USA: Max-
Planck-Gesellschaft, Sep. 2007, pp. 1601–1608.
[85] J. Bu, S. Tan, C. Chen, C. Wang, H. Wu, L. Zhang, and X. He, “Music
recommendation by unified hypergraph: Combining social media
information and music content,” in Proceedings of the 18th ACM
International Conference on Multimedia, New York, NY, USA, 2010,
pp. 391–400.
[86] L. Yao, Q. Z. Sheng, A. H. Ngu, H. Ashman, and X. Li, “Exploring
recommendations in internet of things,” in Proceedings of the 37th
International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in
Information Retrieval, New York, NY, USA, 2014, pp. 855–858.
[87] M. Zhang, Z. Cui, S. Jiang, and Y. Chen, “Beyond link prediction:
Predicting hyperlinks in adjacency space,” in Proceedings of the
Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, (AAAI-18), the
30th innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI-18), and the
8th AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence
(EAAI-18), New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, February 2-7, 2018, pp. 4430–
4437.
